
























zur Zukunft der Arbeit
Institute for the Study 
of Labor 
A Risk Augmented Mincer Earnings Equation?
Taking Stock
IZA DP No. 4439
September 2009
Joop Hartog 
A Risk Augmented Mincer Earnings 








in cooperation with: 
 
Simona Bajdechi Raita, Peter Berkhout, Jose Cabral Vieira, Luis Diaz Serrano, 
Bas Jacobs, Helena Skyt Nielsen, Hans van Ophem, Erik Plug, Juerg Schweri, 











P.O. Box 7240   
53072 Bonn   
Germany   
 
Phone: +49-228-3894-0  







Any opinions expressed here are those of the author(s) and not those of IZA. Research published in 
this series may include views on policy, but the institute itself takes no institutional policy positions. 
 
The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center 
and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent nonprofit 
organization supported by Deutsche Post Foundation. The center is associated with the University of 
Bonn and offers a stimulating research environment through its international network, workshops and 
conferences, data service, project support, research visits and doctoral program. IZA engages in (i) 
original and internationally competitive research in all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of 
policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research results and concepts to the interested public.  
 
IZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. 
Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be 
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We survey the literature on the Risk Augmented Mincer equation that seeks to estimate the 
compensation for uncertainty in the future wage to be earned after completing an education. 
There is wide empirical support for the predicted positive effect of wage variance and the 
negative effect of wage skew. We discuss robustness of the findings across specifications, 
potential bias from unobserved heterogeneity and selectivity and consider the core issue of 
students’ information on benefits from education. 
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1.  Basic hypothesis   
 
Suppose, individuals can either go to work or go to school for five years. The post-school 
log wage is 0.325 higher than the wage from going straight to work. Then, in the basic 
Mincer framework
1 the rate of return to schooling would be 6.5%. Now suppose, the 
direct, unschooled wage is fixed, but the post-school wage is uncertain, at a realistically 
modest standard deviation of 0.25. Then, if an individual would make it to one standard 
deviation above the mean in the post school distribution, the rate of return would be 
11.3%, but if he would not reach above one standard deviation below the mean, his return 
would not surpass 1.3%. Instead of a single return of 6.5% for everyone, two thirds of all 
individuals would have a return somewhere in the wide interval between 1.3 and 11. 3 %.     
 
Of course the essential question would be which part of this variation is risk and which 
part is known to the student but hidden as unobserved heterogeneity to the outsider. Yet, 
there can be no doubt that the decision to engage in an education is a decision under 
uncertainty. There are at least three dimensions in which information is incomplete. The 
potential student will generally not fully grasp the requirements of the school curriculum 
and of the occupations available after graduation, she will usually not even be fully sure of 
her own abilities and preferences and she will not know what the exact returns to the 
investment will be. With uncertainties so prominent, one is inevitably led to expect that the 
returns to education will be shaped not only by compensation for postponing earnings, but 
also by compensation for risk. In fact however, the basic Mincer earnings equation is 
                                                 
1 The basic Mincer framework leads to earnings equation ln Ys – ln Y0 = rS. The standard deviation is taken 
from Hartog, van Ophem and Bajdechi (2007). That paper presents a simulation of the distribution of rates 
of return as a function of stochastic properties of alternative life cycle wage profiles.    4
derived under conditions of certainty on future earnings in the alternatives and the 
estimations similarly ignore the impact of uncertainty. Research on returns to education has 
focussed for decades on getting an unbiased estimate of the causal effect of schooling on 
earnings. Main emphasis is on the proper econometric modelling to deal with omitted ability 
bias, measurement errors in education and the endogeneity of the schooling decision. 
Admittedly, these are serious and stubborn problems, as illustrated by the fact that the dust 
has not settled down and that there is as yet no consensus on true, causal, rates of return to 
education and their variation in response to individual and institutional conditions. Perhaps 
all we can be confident about is an interval of the return for an additional year of education 
between a few percent to an upper limit of some 20 percent.  
 
With uncertainty so prominent, one might have thought that there is a large literature to deal 
with it. In fact, analyses investigating the consequences of uncertain completion of an 
education, incomplete information on abilities and even preferences and on the poor 
predictability of the career development that comes with an education are very scarce
2.  This 
paper can only make a small contribution, by treating just one aspect of the pervasively 
present uncertainty. We focus on the notion that an individual contemplating an education 
does not anticipate a given post-school wage rate but rather an entire wage distribution, 
without knowing exactly where in that distribution she will end up. As the individual 
perceives that the returns to his investment are not certain, he will demand compensation. 
This paper is about the existence and magnitude of a risk premium in the returns to 
education. It turns out that a basic idea on an econometric approach to this problem has been 
                                                 
2 The classic reference for human capital investment under uncertainty is Levhari and Weiss (1974). 
Interest in the role of risk is growing; see the Labour Economics Special Issue on Education and Risk, 2007    5
around for a long time
3. The literature has started with King (1974), who used aggregate 
data by occupation to estimate the effect of variance and skew of wages within an 
occupation on the mean occupational wage. The variance of earnings is taken as a measure 
of risk that individuals want compensation for. Positive skewness of the earnings 
distribution points to the opportunity of attaining real high earnings and this is something 
people want to pay for with reduced expected earnings. With micro data one may proceed in 
two steps. First, estimate a standard Mincer earnings equation, group the residuals by 
education-occupation classification and take the within-group distribution of residuals as 
indicating the uncertainty associated with choosing the particular education-occupation 
combination. In the second stage, add the variance of these education-occupation residuals 
to the earnings function and estimate risk compensation as the regression coefficient of 
earnings on the variances. The two-stage approach was first applied by McGoldrick (1995). 
Following King (1974), she also included the skew of residuals by occupation in the 
regression equation.  
 
Compensation for earnings risk has now been estimated in close to twenty studies. 
Generally, the studies report an earnings premium for risk and a rebate for skew, as theory 
predicts. In this paper we review these studies and assess the evidence so far. In section 2 we 
present a formal model underlying the estimations, in section 3 the empirical specifications. 
In Section 4 we present estimation results. Section 5 addresses the problems of bias from 
heterogeneity and presents estimates that control for these problems. Section 6 considers 
self-selection and the information set that potential students have. Section 7 presents 
                                                 
3 After I suggested this approach to Luis Diaz Serrano for his dissertation, he dug up the early references. A 
referee on one of the papers discussed here noted that the same idea had been repeatedly formulated by 
students.    6
supporting evidence and Section 8 discusses alternative explanations for our results. 
Section 9 wraps up, with conclusions and a research agenda.  
 
 
2.  A simple formal model.  
 
To derive the compensation for earnings postponement and for accepting earnings 
uncertainty, we will first consider schooling choice under utility maximization rather than 
earnings maximisation (which is unavoidable if we analyse uncertainty in a utility 
framework). In the next stage we will examine earnings uncertainty proper. 
 
2.1  Utility maximization in the absence of uncertainty 
 
Individuals face two alternatives: go straight to work, and earn an annual non-stochastic 
income  0 Y  for the rest of their working life, or go to school for s years, and then after school 
earn a non-stochastic income  s Y  for the rest of their working life. We assume individuals 
have an uninhibited choice between alternatives. In equilibrium, lifetime utility should be 
equal. We seek to derive the premium Ms that accomplishes equilibrium, hence 
 
  s s Y M Y ) 1 ( 0 − =    (1) 
 
i.e.,  s M  is the mark-off on  s Y  to equate lifetime utility. Discounting at a rate δ and setting 
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where U(Y) is a standard utility function. With time-independent income (and utility) this 
solves into 
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A simple first-order expansion of U(Y0) around  s Y  generates 
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Clearly, this is a generalisation of Mincer's earnings function. The last two terms jointly are 
the inverse of the income elasticity of utility. Under earnings maximization, U(Y)=Y, and (5) 
reduces to the term in parentheses, implying  0 ln ln s YY s δ = + , the standard Mincer 
equation. 
 
Assuming a constant income elasticity of utility simplifies equation (5). Specifically, with 




























In an expected utility framework, monetary returns will be depreciated by the declining 
marginal utility of income. 
 
2.2  Uncertainty: Risk Aversion and Skewness Affection 
 
Consider an individual who must choose between two options, one with a fixed income 
* Y , 
and the other with random income Y at an expected income of  [ ] EY µ = .  Define Θ  as the 
generalized absolute risk premium:  [ ]
** EY Y Y µ Θ =− = − : an individual in the risky 
situation receives an expected income that exceeds the income of the risk free activity by an 
amount of Θ .  
 
We seek to establish the equilibrium risk premium Θ , i.e., the gap between expected 
income in both positions at which a utility maximizing individual is indifferent between the 
two positions. Utility is defined again as a continuous differentiable function of income 
U(Y), with  /0 UY ∂∂ > .  We also assume risk aversion 
22 /0 UY ∂ ∂< .  Indifference requires 
 
  () [ ] [ ] ( )    with    UE U YE Y µ µ −Θ = =  (8) 
 
To solve for Θ , we follow Pratt (1964, his equations (4) to (7)). For the left-hand side of (8) 
we write 
   9
  ( ) ( ) ( ) UU U µ µµ ′ −Θ = −Θ  (9) 
 
where ( ) U µ ′  is  / UY ∂∂  evaluated at Y µ = . For the right-hand side we retain one more 
term than Pratt did in his Taylor series expansion: 
 




UY U Y U Y U Y U µ µµ µ µ µ µ ′ ′′ ′′′ =+ − + − + −  (10) 
 
where 
22 () / UU Y µ ′′ =∂ ∂   evaluated at Y µ = , and 
33 () / UU Y µ ′′′ = ∂∂  at Y µ = . Hence 
 




EUY U mU m U µ µµ ′′ ′′′ =+ +  (11) 
 
since  [ ] EY µ = , and with  2 m  and  3 m  defining the second and third moments of Y (the 
variance and the skewness) around µ . Equating (9) and (11), we are now able to solve for 
Θ : 
 
















where ( )/ ( ) a VU U µ µ ′′ ′ =−  is the degree of absolute risk aversion. If, by analogy to risk 





aa a Vm VFm Θ= −  (13) 
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Equation (13) is the standard equation for a risk premium as derived by Pratt (1964) and 
Arrow (1965), but now expanded with skewness affection. In this paper, we refer to the 
second moment as risk. 
 






dU U U  + U
   = 
dY U U
′′ ′ ′′′ ′′ −  −  ′ ′ 
 (14) 
 
As Arrow (1965) argues, increasing absolute risk aversion is an absurd assumption, as it 
would imply investing less in risky alternatives if income (wealth) increases. Assuming the 
same holds for choice in the labour market, we require decreasing absolute risk aversion: 
the expression in equation (14) ought to be negative. For this to hold, a necessary but not 
sufficient condition is  0, > U ′ ′ ′  as was first pointed out by Tsiang (1972, p. 359): “Thus, if 
we regard the phenomenon of increasing absolute risk aversion as absurd, we must 
acknowledge that a normal risk-averse individual would have a preference for skewness in 
addition to an aversion to dispersion (variance) of the probability distribution of returns.” 
Since, for a risk averter, V a is positive and since Fa is positive if we assume decreasing 
absolute risk aversion, we conclude from (13) that the absolute risk premium Θ  is positive 
in risk (variance) and negative in skewness. This motivates our terminology of skewness 
affection; for evidence on skewness affection from choices made in gambling and betting, 
see Garrett and Sobel (1999) and Golec and Tamarkin (1998). In the literature on lifetime 
wealth accumulation, skewness affection is called prudence (Gollier, 2001, p 238). 
   11
The empirical model derives more naturally when the compensation for uncertainty is 
expressed through a relative, rather than absolute, risk premium.  It is straightforward to 
rewrite (13) as an equation for the generalized relative risk premium  /µ Π =Θ  (and hence, 
()
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Note that without further assumptions,  r V  and  r F  depend on µ .  But under constant relative 
risk aversion as in equation (6), we would have  r V ρ =  and  1 r F ρ = + ; thus the relative risk 
premium would be constant.   
 
2.3 Combining earnings postponement and uncertainty 
 
Now, let us apply the risk compensation argument in the context of the Mincer framework. 
We know that there are two compensation arguments, earnings postponement and 
uncertainty compensation. In a non-stochastic world, as lifetime post-school income 
f
s Y    12
would be equivalent with a lifetime income of  0 Y . However, after s years of schooling the 
individual in our case faces a stochastic income  s Y , with expectation  [ ] s s EY µ =  and second 
and third moments around the mean  2s m  and  3s m . We now seek the risk premium on this 
fixed post-school income that would compensate for the earnings uncertainty. We express 
this as a mark-off on the expected income in the risky situation, i.e., we replace 
f
s Y  by 
() 1 s s µ −Π  where, as before,  s Π  is the risk premium.  Lifetime equal utility requires 
 








−Π =  
  ∫∫  (16)   
 
Clearly, the discounting factors drop out as income is as yet time-independent. Expanding 
the left hand side around  s µ  in first-order, and the right hand side around  s µ  up to the third 













Π= −  (17) 
 
We now combine compensation for schooling and for risk by writing the non-stochastic 
earnings option as a Mincer mark-up on the riskless no-schooling alternative. Thus, we 
write 
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11
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Suppose, we apply the CRRA simplification, such that 
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which is a simple equation in schooling years, variance term (24) and skewness term (25). 
Hence with observations on relative variance and relative skewness we could estimate a 
Mincer earnings equation augmented with risk compensation, the Risk Augmented Mincer 
equation (RAM). Wages respond positively to risk and negatively to skewness when 
individuals decide on an education based on their knowledge of the second and third 
moment of the wage distribution associated with an education. If we don't assume CRRA,   14
the parameters of (26) will not be constant but depend on income levels. However, as a 
linearization, it would still be a good starting point for empirical work
4.  
 
By necessity, the model is a simplification. It is an extension, with stochastic rather than 
deterministic post-school earnings, of the framework specified by Jacob Mincer, still the 
basis for all routine estimates of returns to education.  Mincer (1974, 9-11) did not even 
bother to spell out the strong underlying assumptions on market structure, individual 
abilities and information, except for a brief reference in the introduction. More elaborate 
estimates of the causal effect of schooling on earnings are often based on Card (1999). 
Card’s model endogenises schooling, allows for unobserved heterogeneity in individuals’ 
cost and benefits but does not allow for any imperfect information by individuals: they 
know all their cost and their prospective returns with certainty. Card’s problem is an 
ignorant researcher looking at an omniscient individual.  His model serves his purpose, but it 
is not the single best model to serve all purposes. Clearly, in our model we make very strong 
assumptions. But so did Mincer and so did Card.  In fact, our model is quite similar to 
Levhari and Weiss (1974), the seminal paper on human capital investment under 
uncertainty. They also use a two period model with uncertain second period returns to 
investment made in the first period. As shown in Appendix 1, our basic equation can also be 
derived from their model. 
 
                                                 
4 In Diaz Serrano, Hartog and Skyt Nielsen (2004) we have extended the model to include permanent and 
transitory shocks in a longitudinal framework. In Hartog and Vijverberg (2002) we estimate parameters of 
the utility function in a model with new shocks at every year of experience.       15
A key assumption of our approach is that individuals cannot insure the risk of their 
investment. To us, this is obvious. We simply do not observe individuals commencing a 
college education and at the same time buying insurance or an optimal investment 
portfolio that completely eliminates the risk of their venture. Davis and Willen (2000) 
assume they would do so and compute optimal portfolios for some occupations. They 
find completely unrealistic values. For example, a 40-year old truck driver (in 1982) 
should hold a portfolio of $550,000, including a short position in one portfolio of 
$141,000. Our view is shared by e.g. Blanchard and Fisher (1989:283) and by Shaw 
(1996:626) who states: “The methods of reducing riskiness that are available in financial 
markets, namely, diversification, exchange, and insurance, are not options for reducing 
the riskiness of returns to human capital investments”. Palacios-Huerta (2003) studies the 
relationship between human capital risk and financial investment in a lifecycle 
consumption framework and reports supporting evidence.  He finds that at the aggregate 
level, the mean-variance frontier does not improve if returns from financial assets are 
added to returns from human capital: adding an optimal financial investment portfolio 
does not improve the pay-off to risk taking. In the converse case (adding human capital to 
financial assets) the frontier does improve. For separate demographic groups, the results 
vary by level of education.  Shaw (1996) reports a similar result, based on her own 
analysis and reference to earlier work: the covariance between human and financial 
wealth is zero, leaving no scope to reduce human capital risk by adequate financial 
investment.   
   16
Note that in the simple formulation of the model given above, the only uncertainty is the 
post-school wage rate. It’s hard to see how this risk can be insured.  Of course there is also 
substantial uncertainty about the further development of earnings during the individual’s 
career. One might argue that an individual does not have to accept uncertain earnings over 
the lifecycle as an inescapable event, as it is always possible to apply consumption 
smoothing. However, this is of course not without cost. Consider uncertainty about income 
in a simple two-period model: all an individual knows is the probability distribution of 
income in the next period. A risk neutral agent (a bank?) would be willing to replace the 
individual’s uncertain future income by its expectation E{Y}, which would then be the 
individual’s sure consumption. But why would this agent leave all the utility gain to the 
individual? A bank certainly would charge a fee. The fee would probably be declining in 
E{Y}, as banks are more interested in attracting larger sums (they also pay higher interest on 
larger deposits). But the fee will no doubt be increasing in the variance of Y, as banks will 
not accept higher risk without compensation. They even dislike volatility, as is shown by the 
premium they pay on long-term deposits, or the penalty they charge for withdrawals. Home-
made consumption smoothing is neither costless. Suppose an individual has random income 
Y in every period and seeks a stable consumption level C, by saving Y-C if positive and 
borrowing C-Y in the opposite case. Assume the bank will accommodate all the individual’s 
actions, but it will do so at different interest rates for saving and borrowing. In a symmetric 
probability distribution, ignoring carry-over between periods (accumulating savings, or 
debts), the expected amount saved will be equal to the expected amount borrowed. But 
expected interest on savings will be less than expected interest on loans, and this will reduce 
C below E{Y}. The gap E{Y} - C is a good measure of the cost of risk. Expected savings   17
and expected loans will increase with the variance of the distribution of Y. Hence the cost of 
risk will also increase in the variance. Intuitively, one expects it to decrease in skewness, as 
savings are favoured over loans. But these are of course just the predictions needed for the 
basic hypothesis. One may sense that this intuitive argument survives in a multiple period 
model where savings (and debts) can be accumulated, but with the outcome conditioned by 
the serial correlation of the income draws
5. Of course, the literature on stochastic dynamic 
programming has been developed precisely because an individual cannot smooth 
consumption by replacing uncertain future income by its expected value (see e.g. Carroll, 
2001; Low, 2005). There can be little doubt that lifetime welfare is declining in wage 
volatility.      
 
 
3. Empirical  specifications   
 
Several specifications have been used to obtain measures of risk and skew, and below we 
will present a survey of estimation results. The first analysis, by King (1974), used variance 
and skew of earnings in occupational cells and estimated equation (5) at the aggregate level. 
Feinberg (1981) used a short panel to estimate each individual’s coefficient of variation over 
6 years. McGoldrick (1995) introduced the two-step procedure. With cross-section data, she 
first estimated an earnings function   
                                                 
5 Cochrane (2001) points out that in a lifetime welfare maximising framework variance as such is not 
relevant: it’s the covariance of an asset with consumption that is essential. Levhari and Weiss (1974) also 
stress the key importance of the covariance between marginal utility of consumption and returns to 
education. We still denote the residual variance of wages as risk, as we abstract from optimal consumption 
profiles over the life cycle.   18
ln ij i j j ij
j
YX d = ++ ∑ β αε   (6) 
 
where the subscripts i and j denote individuals and the education cell the individual 
belongs to respectively. The dj are dummy variables for education cells (fixed effects). 
The variables included in X are years of education, age and age squared and, depending 
on specification, dummies for gender and ethnicity. Generally, no other explanatory 
variables in X are included, as the common variables that may be available (such as 
industry, firm and job characteristics) are all unknown to the individual when deciding on 
education
6. The education fixed-effects αj are included in order to control for the effect of 
omitted variables that may bias the measures of risk and skew within an education cell. 














=− ∑  
 
(7) 
where eij is the exponential of the estimated residuals εij in equation (6) and Nj is the 
number of observations in cell j. In (7), R and K are simply estimated as the second and 
third moment of the distribution of exp(εj). In the second step the estimated values for R 
and K are included in the wage equation  
 




                                                 
6 If the variables in X, like industry, firm size, etc would reflect perfectly compensating differentials 
associated with free choice, they would have to be included as the residuals would then be standardized on 
equal-utility wages. This assumption is too strong to accept.    19
Dummies for education cells cannot be included in (8) since R and K are already fixed in 
a given education cell.  
 
Hartog and Vijverberg (2002) introduced a specification that is closer to the model in 
section 2. First, estimate 
   ji i ji X LnW ε β + =  (9) 
 
where i indicates the individual and j indicates the occupation-schooling group that the 
individual belongs to. Years educated is one of the variables in the matrix X. Define 
2
j σ  as 
the variance of the disturbance  ji ε  in occupation/education cell j. Use the estimated 
parameter vector  ˆ β  and the estimated variance 
2 ˆ j σ  to predict the wage rate for each 
individual through: 
 
  ( )
2 ˆ ˆ ˆ exp /2 ji i j WX βσ =+  (10) 
 
Finally, calculate wage deviations  ji ji W W ˆ −  and from these the relative variance  j R  and 

















































In (10), the variance term is added to the mean to reflect that the disturbances of the earnings 
distributions are approximately lognormal, as is commonly assumed. Were the distribution   20
indeed lognormal, equation (10) would hold exactly.
7 R and K are the sample estimates of 
relative variance and relative skew, as defined in equations (24) and (25).  In practice, (7) 
and (11)-(12) are equivalent: in Danish panel data (Diaz-Serrano, Hartog and Nielsen, 
2004) the measures in (11) and (12) correlate better than 0.99 in each of 17 years with 
those in (7).    
 
 
4.Estimates of the Risk Augmented Mincer Equation  
 
In Table 1, we present estimates of the Risk Augmented Mincer Equation. Grosso modo 
one could say these are first generation estimates, where risk and skewness are measured 
within occupations. Whenever relevant, the regressions include a parabolic age 
(experience) profile. Sometimes there are additional controls, in particular in the second 
stage (the first stage should not control for effects that the individual cannot anticipate 
when choosing an education, such as e.g. firm size). The estimates strongly support the 
basic hypothesis of risk compensation. The coefficient for risk is positive in all but one 
case and significant, usually at high levels in all studies except the study with union 
interaction. The elasticity is mostly in the interval 0.1 – 0.2. The coefficient of skewness  
is negative, except in 4 out of the 19 cases, usually but not always at high levels of 
statistical significance. The elasticity is small, mostly below 0.10. The study with union 
interaction, by Moore (1995), focuses on benefits that unions bring their members. 
Compensation for wage risk is insignificant in both unionised and non-unionised jobs. 
                                                 
7 Hartog and Vijverberg (2002) test for log normality and mostly reject it. Still, adding the variance reduces 
the bias in the estimate of the mean.    21
Interestingly, in jobs covered by union contract workers have less wage variability and 
more hours variability, suggesting that unions manage to reduce wage risk, but pay for it 
with higher hours risk. They also bring higher compensation for wage risk than in the 
non-union sector, but the difference is statistically not significant.   
 
The early studies and the replications suffer from flaws that have to be addressed before 
any firm conclusions can be drawn. First, earnings risk is measured at the level of 
occupations, and thus will be sensitive to selective mobility. Individuals who are not 
successful in an occupation may try their luck elsewhere
8. With overrepresentation of 
workers with good draws, observed earnings overestimate the earnings of all those who 
tried this occupation. With truncation of the earnings distribution at the low end, 
observed variance of earnings is an underestimate of risk, while skewness is 
overestimated. Thus the risk coefficient will be overestimated. The effect on the 
coefficient of skewness cannot be predicted as both expected earnings and skewness are 
overestimated. Better estimates can be obtained with observations grouped by education, 
as one cannot escape bad draws after the education has been completed. If risk induced 
mobility between occupations is important, one must predict that education based 
estimates give lower  
 
                                                 
8 Johnson (1977) and McGoldrick and Robst (1996) report a higher compensation in occupations with less 
mobility to other occupations: lock-in effects are compensated.  
   22
Table 1 The Risk Augmented Mincer equation: occupations 
 
Author  country  data/year  N  R, K   Elasticity R    Elasticity K  Controls 




  1960 Census 
37 occupations 
(professions, 4 years 
college) 
Standard deviation. 




(4.77)  Ability (Project Talent) 
Johnson (1977)        
  USA  1970 Census  55-107 occupations  Standard deviation  0.11
b)  -  Within age-education groups 






PSID panel  1419 individuals 
Individual coefficient of 
variation over 6 years 
0.01 
(2.53) - 
IQ, education, occupation; higher 
compensations for the more risk 
averse 










residual earnings (time, 
time sq) 
M: 0.17  (11.57 
F: 0.50  (6.87)    Mobility, 7 occupations 









occupation  exp(εj) 
M:0.05 (1.90) 
F: -0.23 (8.14) 
0.05  (7.92) 
-0.006 (0.96)  
Table 8.5  2000 
51 educations-
occupations  exp(εj) 
M:0.18 (3.70) 
F: 0.65 (10.75) 
0.02  (0.80) 
-0.09 (3.26)   
Hartog et al (2003) Table 1,2         




-0.06 (3.32)  6 industry dummies 
 
West 
Germany  SOEP 1992  41 occupations  exp(εj) 
M: 0.11  (4.02) 
F: 0.25  (6.06) 
-0.02  (3.07) 
-0.05  (4.42)  6 industry dummies 
 
East 
Germany  SOEP 1992  28 occupations  exp(εj) 
M: 0.12  (5.03) 
F: 0.08  (2.64) 
-0.01  (0.91) 
-0.02  (1.57) 
 






Pesoal 1992  70 occupations  exp(εj) 
M: 0.37  (33.35) 
F: 0.76  (30.65) 
-0.17  (24.08)
-0.03  (2.32) 
6 occupation dummies, 7 industry 
dummies, tenure, firm size, 
ownership and age   23
 
Table 1 continued           
Author country  data/year  N  R,  K  Elasticity R   Elasticity K  Controls 






Salarial 1995 83 occupations  exp(εj) 
M: 0.29  (58.11) 
F: 0.10  (11.65) 
-0.02  (8.45) 
-0.02  (35.83)
Bargaining regime, public/private, 6 
industry dummies, 6 occupation 
dummies, city size 







occupation  Relative variance, skew
M: 0.16  (15) 
F: 0.05  (4) 
-0.06  (26) 
-0.17  (14)  Elasticities, t-values averaged 
    
104 education-
occupation  Interquantile ranges 
M: 0.44  (20) 
F: 0.08  (3) 
-0.26  (12) 
-0.45  (15)   
Diaz-Serrano (2000) Table 7.3         
 
Spain 
  EPF 1990  83 occupation  exp(εj) 
M: 0.02  (7.4) 
F: 0.04  (4.2) 
-0.02  (2.8) 
-0.10  (4.8) 
Family status, region, industry, skill 
level 





1987  856 individuals 
Individual’s coefficient 
of variation 
Union –0.08 (0.39) 
Non-union 0.09 (?)   Risk interacted with union dummy 
 
 t-values refer to estimated coefficient, not to elasticity 
a)  Regression coefficients: units and means not reported  












   24
 
 
Table 2 The Risk Augmented Mincer equation: education 
 
           
Author  country  data/year  N  R, K   Elasticity R    Elasticity K  Controls 
Diaz-Serrano, Hartog, Nielsen (2004) Table 2         
 Denmark  1984-2000  75  educations  exp(εj)  0.03
a) -0.005
a)  Men, aged 30-40 clustered 
Berkhout, Hartog and Webbink (2006) Table 1, all         
  Netherlands  LSO 1997  66 educations  exp(εj)  0.2  (3.69)  -0.1  (2.57  Clustered 
- - 
Elsevier/SEO 
1996-2001  100 educations  exp(εj)  0.08  (4.53  -0.04  (3.25) 
Starting salaries, tertiary education 
clustered 




  1995 53  educations  exp(εj)  0.222  (16.50  -0.034  (2.42)  Clustered 
Model 2    relative error  0.202  (16.96)  -0.008 (10.00)   
Model 3      Interquartile ranges  0.035  (11.67)  -0.016  (2.50)   





1996-2006 111  educations  exp(εj) 
M: 0.05  (2.19) 
F: 0.04  (2.43) 
-0.13  (5.50) 
-0.10  (6.43) 
Regression on mean earnings by 
education, personal characteristics 
clustered; starting salaries 





1995-1999  DOT-SEO cells  Cell means 
M: 1.07  (9.34) 
F: 0.86  (5.41)   




a) Elasticity averaged over 17 annual estimates (all significant); mean R and K from IZA DP 963 
t-values refer to estimated coefficient, not to elasticity 
 
   25
estimated risk compensation than occupation based estimates, while the effect on 
estimated skewness affection cannot be predicted.  
 
The studies in Table 1 also fail to recognize a complication in the estimated standard 
errors. As noted by Moulton (1986), with R and K measured at group level, errors may be 




Table 2 presents second generation estimates, with risk and skewness measured by 
education and with standard errors corrected for clustering, or with mean earnings 
regressed on mean risk and skewness. The basic conclusion is unaffected: a positive 
effect of risk and a negative effect of skewness, both statistically significant. We cannot 
compare the magnitudes of the coefficients (elasticities) between Table 1 and Table 2, as 
they are based on different datasets and different controls, so we cannot test the 
prediction that education based measures lead to lower elasticities than occupation based 
measures. As we noted above, there is no difference between measuring risk and 
skewness with the exponential specification or as relative measures (equation (7) versus 
(11)-(12)). In Diaz-Serrano and Hartog (2006), we have also tested another specification, 
with R and K based on interquartile ranges. As R and K will be sensitive to outliers, we 
have calculated the percentile distribution of the residuals in the first stage, and defined R 
as the difference between the 75
th and the 25
th percentile and K as( )( ) 75 50 50 25 PP PP −− . 
                                                 
9 The Moulton problem is not relevant for Johnson (1977) and King (1974), who estimated on aggregate 
data by occupation and for Feinberg (1981), who estimated on panel data.      26
As can be seen both in Table 1 and in Table 2, we still obtain significant effects with the 
proper signs.  
 
On top of the Moulton problem, we have to realise that R and K are measured from a first 
stage regression and will be subject to sampling errors. Murphy and Topel (1986) have 
presented a method for consistent estimation of the variances of the second stage 
parameter estimates. In Diaz Serrano and Hartog (2006), the corrections for clustering 
and for generated regressors are combined, by replacing the conventional OLS 
covariance matrix estimator in Moulton’s adjustment by the covariance estimator 
proposed by Murphy and Topel. The Moulton correction for clustering is important, but 
the additional correction for generated regressors has negligible effect on estimated 
standard errors.  
 
With R and K fixed for a given occupation or education, second stage regressions cannot 
include a fixed effect. Thus, it may be that R and K do not measure any dimension of risk 
but simply some fixed effect of occupation of risk that is not picked up by the controls. In 
Diaz Serrano, Hartog and Nielsen (2003) we have regressed education fixed effects from 
the first stage earnings functions on R and K (both permanent and transitory, see below). 
The effect of R and K on these fixed effects was not statistically significant, thus 
indicating that R and K are not just representing education fixed effects through the back 
door. In Diaz Serrano and Hartog (2006) we applied the same test to our estimates for 
Spain, with the same result. We can be pretty confident that R and K are not just 
unidentified education effects.   27
 
It’s worth pointing out that our results appear not due to the effect of omitted variables on 
the quality of jobs. In Hartog and Vijverberg (2007) we report that the estimates are 
insensitive to the inclusion of measures of job disamenities such as physical burdens or 




5.  Bias from unobserved heterogeneities? 
 
An immediate objection to using the observed distribution of earnings residuals is the 
possible confounding of risk and heterogeneity. The (residual) distribution of earnings 
will be affected by many variables that for an individual may not pose any risk at all. 
Probably the most prominent of these variables is individual ability. But individuals may 
also differ in risk attitudes and they may even face individually different risk. To address 
these issues, in Jacobs, Hartog and Vijverberg (2008) we set up a simple model with a 
safe fixed wage job (with wage Ws) and a risky job with stochastic wage, at expectation 
E(Wr). We did not refer specifically to educations as the problem is identical in a 
situation where individuals can choose a job or an occupation without first spending time 
in school (the required Mincer compensation for postponing earnings can simply be 
added to earnings). We consider only risk and ignore skewness. 
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If individuals are identical in all aspects (risk aversionρ , risk 
2 σ  and “ability” expressed 
as expected productivity in the risky job (in the safe job they have equal productivity 
anyway), in equilibrium the expected risky wage will just compensate for risk and 
allocation will be arbitrary. Risk is properly estimated as observed wage variance in the 
risky job; the coefficient of risk compensation is estimated as the observed wage gap 
divided by wage variance, without bias, from the equilibrium condition E(Wr) =  Ws  + 
2 /2 ρσ . This is a stripped down version of the model in section 2.  Note that ρ  is 
estimated from the wage gap divided by half the variance.  
 
To assess the effects of heterogeneity, we distinguish three cases. First, we assume that 
individuals only differ in risk attitudes, and have identical abilities and risk. This poses no 
special problem. The wage gap between risky and safe jobs is now determined by the risk 
attitude of the marginal individual, and this is just what is estimated in the OLS 
regression. Second, if individuals only differ in the magnitude of risk and are otherwise 
identical, residual earnings variance underestimates true risk of the marginal worker, as 
only low risk individuals enter the risky job. As a consequence, risk compensation is 
overestimated. If individuals differ in both risk and risk attitude, the case is rather 
unusual. The threshold for entering the risky job is now defined as a critical value of the 
product of risk and risk attitude: the threshold for entry is a contour of combinations of 
the two variables that separate entry from non-entry in the risky job. There is no single 
critical value of any of these variables and by consequence they cannot be estimated. The 
coefficient that is estimated in the Risk Augmented Mincer equation can now be 
interpreted as the maximum value of risk aversion for the individual that has the mean   29
value of risk among those individuals who actually chose the risky job. The third case is 
where individuals only differ in ability, reflected in their expected earnings in the risky 
job; assuming individuals know their ability and the researcher does not, we have a 
garden variety of selectivity. The observed wage gap between the two jobs is now an 
overestimate of the wage premium, as the mean value of the risky wage also includes the 
effect of ability for those who chose the risky job (only more able individuals enter the 
risky job, as the ability premium should serve as a premium for accepting higher risk). 
Observed wage variance in the risky job is an overestimate of risk, as it also includes the 
variance of ability between individuals. With risk aversion estimated as the ratio between 
wage gap and observed variance, we cannot predict the sign of the bias, as both 
numerator and denominator are biased upward. To assess this case, we revert to 
simulation. We find that the ambiguity in the sign of the bias cannot be resolved by 
restriction to reasonable or plausible parameter values: depending on parameter values it 
may just as well be positive as negative. Considering the plausibility of parameter values 
we tend to conclude that underestimation of risk aversion is probably more likely than 
overestimation. But the key implication is that one cannot dismiss the risk compensation 
estimates as unreliable because they always produce an overestimated coefficient.  
 
Below, we will discuss extensively whether ability is known to the individual and may 
generate an unobserved heterogeneity for the researcher, or whether individuals are also 
poorly informed. Here, we just note that observations on ability are available in several 
datasets, and that we are in a position to assess the effect of omitted ability bias in our 
estimates. Interestingly, the very first tests of the risk compensation hypothesis already   30
allowed for ability differences. King (1974) controlled for ability as measured in the 
Project Talent. Significant effects of risk and skewness were found while controlling for 
five ability measures: mathematics, English, reading comprehension, abstract reasoning 
and arithmetic reasoning. The basic conclusion was also upheld after splitting the sample 
in two classes of competing groups, technical and non-technical (a distinction confirmed 
by discriminant analysis on the basis of the five abilities). Estimation separately within 
the two groups, with their own measures of risk and skewness, confirmed the basic 
results. Feinberg (1981), testing on a panel with individual intertemporal variance as his 
measure of risk, found support in regressions that include IQ (a sentence completion test, 
on which no further information is given).  
 
In Berkhout, Hartog and Webbink (2006) we analyse starting salaries for graduates from 
tertiary education in The Netherlands. Instead of using R and K for all individuals with 
the same education, we calculate these measures for ability quartiles as measured by the 
individuals’ average grades for their secondary school final exam. This is a relevant 
stratification, as it is based on information for which we are sure that the individuals 
themselves also have it at their disposal. The model underlying the risk compensation 
hypothesis assumes that students perceive their risk and then decide on education. If 
desired, they could use the same information as we do, by stratifying on secondary school 
grades. As the results in Table 3 indicate, after controlling for ability in this way the basic 
results are upheld. In fact, if we compare the results in detail (differentiating by gender 
and two types of tertiary education, i.e. higher vocational and university), we find   31
regression coefficients for R and K that barely differ. There is no bias from omitting 
ability that can be picked up by secondary school grade quartile.  
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Table 3. Regressing log wage on risk R and skewness K; R and K measured within 
the individual’s secondary school grade quartile (SEO/Tertiary starters) 
 
  R  t  K  T               N          
All tertiary       
All           2.67          3.95         -3.19           3.33       45020 
Men            1.96          4.07         -2.66           3.98       19659 
Women           2.44           3.01        -2.14           1.98       25361 
Vocational       
All           2.99          4.80         -3.66           4.01       21431 
Men           1.86          3.43         -2.55           3.61         8600 
Women           2.97          4.59         -2.68           2.72       12831 
University        
All   2.80  4.89 -3.83 4.40….23 589 
Men 1.65  3.30 -1.92 2.19….11  059 
Women 2.57  1.77 -3.07 1.74….12  530 
 
t values based on robust standard errors clustered by education type. Grades only in second stage 
regression; first stage regressions separately by grade quartile. Source: Berkhout, Hartog and Webbink 
(2006).  
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Panel data are interesting for at least two reasons. By considering individual wage 
variation over time, unobserved heterogeneity is eliminated. Some of the first generation 
studies used panel data, and measured risk as the individual variance over time. Feinberg 
(1981) and McGoldrick and Robst (1996) each used 6 waves of the PSID and found 
statistically significant effects of individually measured risk, although the magnitude of 
the effect in the former study was very small. Moore (1995) measures risk individually 
from ten waves of the PSID and finds no significant risk compensation within either the 
union or the non-union sector, but instead finds that unions provide wage insurance 
(lower variance) at the price of higher hours variability.  
 
Second, with panel data we can separate earnings variation between individuals from 
variation for given individuals over time. With a large and long Danish panel (1984-
2000), Diaz Serrano, Hartog and Nielsen (2004) separate the earnings residual in an 
individual (random) effect and an annual transitory shock.  We take the variance of the 
individual effects of individuals within the same education as the permanent risk of that 
education and the variance of the transitory component within an education as transitory 
risk, using 75 educations. If consumption smoothing holds, we expect no compensation 
for transitory risk, if individuals know their ability we expect no compensation for 
permanent risk. We insert the values in the wage equation for the pooled panel and we 
report the results in Table 4. The compensations for permanent and for transitory risk are 
both highly significant, though the elasticities are quite modest in magnitude.  As to 
skewness, compensation for the permanent component is highly significant, with the right 
sign. For the transitory component, however, the prediction of a negative sign is squarely   34
rejected, with a significant positive effect.  Again, the panel data estimates do not suggest 
an overestimation of compensation because of unobserved heterogeneity. We also have 
estimated the standard equation on each of the 17 years of our panel data. The average 
coefficient value from these 17 estimates is about equal to the estimate for the permanent 
component for both R and K, while the panel data estimate for the transitory component 
is much larger than annual average
10.  The results for the permanent component are at 
variance with the hypothesis that individuals know their own fixed effect and need no 
compensation for it, the results for transitory risk are at variance with full and costless 
consumption smoothing.  
 
Comparable results are obtained with the NLSY panel for the United States, with the 
same risk decomposition (permanent risk from individual random effects, transitory risk 
from the annual transitory shocks), but with compensation for risk only tested on the 
wage equation for the final year (Raita, 2005). Risk and skewness are measured in 
education-ability cells, with two levels of education and 10 ability deciles (AFQT), 
resulting in 17 observations (as not all cells contain sufficient number of observations). 
Again one finds that risk compensation has the predicted sign, both permanent and 
transitory, although insignificantly so in one case. For skewness, the predicted effect for 
transitory shocks is found but permanent skewness has no significant effect.  
                                                 
10 Annual averages are in table 6 of our IZA Discussion Paper 963 (Diaz-Serrano, Hartog and Skyt Nielsen, 
2003).   35
 










































   
Notes:  
a. Controls include years of education, age, age squared, and dummies for industry and occupation. Each 
cell contains coefficient, t-value in parentheses and elasticity in italics. Compensation estimated on pooled 
panel data. Source:  Diaz Serrano, Hartog and Nielsen (2004) 
b. Controls included for marital status, region, some occupation dummies, IQ test score (AFQT); the data 
are from NLSY 1979 (1979-2000). Compensation estimated on wages in 2000. Source: Raita, 2005, Tables 
5.6, 5.7.  
        
 
Unobserved individual heterogeneity is also filtered out if we use individuals’ 
expectations. Schweri, Hartog and Wolter (2008) analyse data on the probability 
distribution of wages that Swiss students expect for themselves from different potential 
schooling scenarios: medians and dispersion measures elicited with the Dominitz and 
Manski method (see next section). Expected risk variables show a positive effect, 
expected skewness variables a negative effect on expected median wage. In fact, we even   36
get similar values for the elasticities: a risk elasticity of 0.12 and a skewness elasticity of 
–0.011. These values are in the middle of the interval of values that we found in the 
empirical literature based on market data. The regression coefficients are only modestly 
reduced if we include individual fixed effects in the regressions.  
 
One may have doubts that R and K properly measure the uncertainty they are meant to 
measure. In that respect it is reassuring that if we use dispersion measures derived from 
the percentile distribution of residual earnings, the results are not essentially different 
(Hartog and Vijverberg, 2007). Supporting evidence is also provided by Pereira and 
Martins (2002). They measure risk as the difference between returns to education in the 
highest and the lowest decile in quantile regression. Regressing the Mincer rate of return 
on risk across 16 countries, they find a significant positive effect with implied elasticity 
of 0.2. Even though there are only 16 observations, the evidence is neatly in line with the 
other results we report here. 
 
 
6.  Self-selection: what do students know?  
 
The hypothesis of risk compensation in wages is based on the assumption that supply 
decisions by potential students affect market wages. Students are supposed to act on the 
financial uncertainty associated with an education. The estimations we presented use 
observed residual variances as an indicator of risk. It’s by now a natural reflex of labour 
economists to assume a selectivity problem here, on the hypothesis that individuals are   37
well informed on their abilities and their income prospects. Selectivity corrections are 
based on the assumption that students, when they take their decisions, have better 
information on future returns than the researcher and precisely these decisions make the 
observed distribution of residuals a biased estimate of the actual uncertainty: we observe 
realised, not potential uncertainty. A proper econometric modelling and a proper 
estimation technique should retrieve the true dispersion that individuals base their 
decision on. If we just use the observed distribution of residuals, we confuse unobserved 
heterogeneity and risk. In section 5 we indicated that selectivity by no means leads to 
unambiguous biases and that we cannot the discard the results as obviously spurious. 
Here, we will consider the issue of student information more generally.    
 
There are very few empirical studies to inform us on this distinction between risk and 
heterogeneity. Chen (2008) uses the NLSY 1979-2000 and estimates wage equations and 
schooling choice. The wage equation contains a permanent and a transitory effect, the 
schooling choice contains unobserved heterogeneity. The transitory component cannot be 
foreseen by the individual, but individual uncertainty on the permanent component is 
reduced through its correlation with unobserved heterogeneity in the schooling choice 
equation: the unobserved heterogeneity factors allow the individual a better prediction of 
the permanent effect in wages (a lower variance) than the outside observer. Chen finds 
that wage uncertainty (the unforeseen transitory component in wages plus the 
incompletely foreseen permanent component) does not deviate much from observed wage 
inequality. Observed residual variances in wages, for less than high school, high school, 
some college and college are 0.526, 0.411, 0.500 and 0.512, respectively, while   38
calculated wage uncertainties are 0.485, 0.406, 0.497 and 0.472. That would make 
observed inequality a good indicator of uncertainty
11. In an earlier version of the paper, 
the selectivity correction on the variance of the permanent component was shown to be 
negligible (Chen, 2003). Chen and Khan (2007) focus on the average effect of  education 
on wage inequality (residual variance): college versus high school or less. OLS 
estimation gives a ratio of 1.08, Heckman two-stage 1.09, an IV estimate gives 0.94 and 
pairwise matching gives 1.29. The absolute effect is also quite small. Straightforward 
OLS estimation of an earnings model yields residual standard deviation of 0.397 for 
college and 0.370 for high school graduates, while two-stage Heckman estimation gives 
0.455 and 0.445 (o.c., Table 5 in the 2005 working paper version). Heckman, with 
several co-authors, has developed an elaborate framework to identify counterfactual 
distributions of earnings for various schooling choices. The method rests on the notion 
that if information on results that only become observable to the outsider in realised 
outcomes has an impact on schooling choices it must have been in the agent’s 
information set when making the choice. In a survey paper, Cunha and Heckman (2007, 
p.892) conclude: “For a variety of market environments and assumptions about 
preferences, a robust empirical regularity is that over 50% of the ex post variance in the 
returns to schooling are forecastable at the time students make their college choices”. 
Arcidianoco (2004) focuses on information on ability; with his econometric specification 
he estimates that 50-60% of the variance of an ability indicator related to major in 
university is noise. 
 
                                                 
11 The numbers are not equal to those in Chen’s Table 4, but have been corrected for obvious printing 
errors.     39
Rather than extracting evidence from observed behaviour through an imposed 
econometric model, one might simply question individuals about their information set. 
We should point out that here we are not interested in the true risk associated with an 
education. What matters in our case is the belief of potential students on the risks they are 
facing, as this is what they act on. We encounter a methodological divide here. Under a 
strict instrumentalist approach, it’s irrelevant what individuals believe: all that matters is 
the quality of the prediction. Alternatively, one may argue that if individuals are 
inevitably to base their choices on expected outcomes, one might as well study these 




The direct approach to eliciting perceptions on the risk of returns to education has been 
pioneered by Dominitz and Manski (1996). Their study is rather exploratory in 
methodology, with only 71 high school students and 39 college students, but it is very 
carefully executed and gives unusual insights. Students are asked to answer questions in a 
computer-executed survey, with feedback to correct errors. First, they are asked the 
median salary for a given educational scenario (complete high school), with an 
explanation of what a median is. Next, the program calculates 75% of the median salary 
and asks for the probability that the student’s future salary will not surpass this level, and 
it asks for the probability of surpassing 125% of the median, with feedback on answers 
that violate the rules of probability. Assuming a normal distribution of future salaries, the 
answers are sufficient to calculate the individual’s parameters of this distribution. 
                                                 
12 See Blaug (1980) on the Lester-Machlup controversy (Chapter 7) and on Friedman’s methodological 
stance (Chapter 4).   40
Students appear to have widely divergent anticipations. For example, among male high 
school students asked for expected median earnings at age 30 in the scenario where they 
will have completed a bachelor degree, the 10th decile expects 25 000 dollars whereas 
the 90
th decile expects 56 000 dollars. On the dispersion in their future distribution of 
earnings, the same groups, under the same scenario, expect interquartile ranges of 28 000 
and 58 000 dollars. Perceived returns also differ widely. At age 30, the male high school 
students at the 10
th percentile expect an earnings advantage from college of 10 000 
dollars, at the 90
th percentile they expect a gain of 30 000 dollars. Students were also 
asked to state the actual dispersion of earnings by education. Generally, they overestimate 
the interquartile range. Interestingly, predictions of their own median expected salary 
correlate positively with their perception of the actual median: “Respondents who believe 
current median earnings to be high (low) tend also to expect their own earnings to be high 
(low)” (o.c., p 25).  
 
Wolter and Weber (2004) apply the Dominitz and Manski approach to Swiss students. 
They also find large dispersion in expected medians (a coefficient of variation across 
individuals of about 0.20) and considerable uncertainty as reflected in the interquartile 
range. Americans’ individual uncertainty is larger than actual interquartile ranges, 
whereas for Swiss students individual uncertainty is smaller than actual dispersion. The 
Swiss students are asked for individual wage expectations under two scenarios, secondary 
education and tertiary education. These estimates are not significantly different from 
actually observed medians for these groups (the mean signed error is not significantly 
different from zero). Most interestingly, the deviations do not differ between respondents   41
with different actual schooling choice (students in high school, in a business college or a 
university of applied science), neither for men nor for women, neither for age 30 nor for 
age 40. This does not point at selectivity related expectations. Rather, the outcomes are 
compatible with all students anchoring their expectations on actually observed wages. 
 
Schweri, Hartog and Wolter (2008), also argue against a pervasive role for superior 
private information. Using another set of data on Swiss students collected with the 
Dominitz and Manski method, they report that individuals’ expectations on the 
distribution parameters of earnings for specified education choices are related to 
individuals’ perceptions on these parameters for employees already in the labour market 
and who have realised these choices. That is, an individual’s expectations mirror just 
what they see in the labour market as realised outcomes
13. Even more interestingly, 
deviations between an individual’s predictions for himself and his perceptions of realised 
market outcomes for those who have chosen the particular schooling scenario are not 
systematically related to variables that could reveal private information. Neither family 
background nor ability (secondary school grade for math) explain the differences. This is 
similar to results reported by Nicholson and Souleles (2001). They use survey data from 
students at a particular medical school in the US to assess the formation of income 
expectations and their relevance for explaining the choice of medical specialty. Income 
expectations are strongly anchored on perceived contemporaneous incomes, without 
exclusively determining them. For every 1000 dollar increase in the actual 
                                                 
13 McKenzie, Gibson and Stillman (2007) underscore the value of direct measurement of expectations. 
They also apply the Dominitz and Manski method and find that potential emigrants from Tonga 
underestimate earnings in New Zealand, probably because actual emigrants under-report to restrict transfer 
obligations to relatives back home.    42
contemporaneous income of the specialty that the student plans to enter, the student’s 
expectation for that specialty goes up by 590 dollars. For every 1000 dollars difference 
between the student’s estimate of contemporaneous specialty income and actual specialty 
income, the student’s expected income goes up by 840 dollars. Misperceptions in actual 
specialty income end up almost dollar for dollar in income expectations. By contrast, the 
effect of “ability” is very small: performing in the top quartile of the exam at the end of 
the second year in medical school only increases expected income by 5.9%.  
 
Results by Brunello, Lucifora and Winter-Ebmer  (2004) are also at variance with 
anticipations from the private information hypothesis. They collected information on 
expected earnings from university students in ten European countries (business and 
economics). The expected wage premium over high school graduates at labour market 
entry was unrelated to any variable except age: not to parental background, not to channel 
of information about future earnings (university publication, career center, special 
reports, press, personal communication), not to reason for choosing their selected 
university, not to self-assessed relative ability. The expected premium of university over 
high school graduation after ten years of experience is only significantly lower for older 
students, women and students with longer expected time to complete the degree (and 
again not related to self-assessed ability). These results only refer to university students, 
not to those who choose not to go to university, but they do not point to systematic 
patterns in expected benefits, except for the effect of expected length of study, which 
possibly reflects an update of initial expectations during the study.  
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Perhaps the strongest blow to the notion of superior information about one’s future 
position in the wage distribution is from Webbink and Hartog (2004). First-year students 
can predict differences in mean salaries by fields of education but they cannot predict 
their own starting salary after graduation, four years ahead. The correlation between an 
individual’s starting salary after graduation predicted upon entering tertiary education and 
the realisation after graduation is a mere 0.06.  
 
We conclude that direct measurement of potential students’ information points to a large 
dispersion between individuals and to substantial perceived uncertainty by individuals on 
their own prospects. The large dispersion indicates that students do not all just use 
observed distributions for graduates already in the market as their own expected 
distribution. But the differences in their expectations are neither compatible with an 
obvious pattern of private information: they are unrelated to self-assessed ability. Even 
more telling: Dutch first-year students appeared unable to predict their position in the 
distribution of starting salaries. There is evidence, however to support the hypothesis that 
students anchor their expectations on their perceptions of actual rewards in the labour 
market, but differ in these perceptions. This is certainly a hypothesis worthy of further 
investigation.  Econometric modelling to extract information from observed behaviour 
lends more support to the relevance of self-selection, although the magnitude of the 
correction is for private information is uncertain and not necessarily large.  
  
 
7.  Supporting evidence  
   44
To consider the credibility of the results, we may consider some circumstantial evidence. 
First of all, we may note that compensation for risks in the labour market is well 
established, both for instability of employment and for health and morbidity hazards 
(Rosen, 1986). In fact, employer behaviour exhibits mirror effects of the risk 
compensation we analyse here. Fresh graduates pose a risk for employers to the extent 
that they cannot accurately assess their potential productivity. But as graduates have no 
alternative for putting their education at work, we expect employers to shift the risk of 
unknown abilities to employees. Using variance and skewness of students’ grades in 
different disciplines as indicators of employer uncertainty we find that starting wages are 
lower in fields with high variance and higher in fields with high skewness (Berkhout, 
Hartog and van Ophem, 2009).  
 
More specifically, we will cite evidence that individuals care about financial risk when 
choosing a career, that structural parameters estimated for risk compensation are in line 
with estimates in life cycle consumption models and that more risk loving workers 
experience higher wage growth.  
 
Evidence that individuals care about the financial risk when choosing a labour market 
position is given by King (1974) and by Saks and Shore (2003). They note that with risk 
aversion declining in wealth, one should expect that students from wealthier backgrounds 
choose more risky occupations. This is precisely what they find in American data. Lazear 
(2005) reports that individuals are more likely to start their own business firm if the first 
industry in which they were employed after leaving university has high wage variance,   45
suggesting they select themselves into positions to match their relatively low risk 
aversion. Diaz-Serrano (2005) and Dohmen et al. (2007) document such selection more 
explicitly. Diaz-Serrano measures earnings uncertainty as residual variance in Italian 
panel data after removing individual fixed effects and finds that earnings uncertainty 
correlates significantly with the stated reservation price for a lottery ticket: more risk 
averse individuals have less earnings uncertainty. Dohmen et al use a measure of 
individual risk attitude obtained from a survey question (validated in experimental data) 
and measure earnings risk as residual earnings variance by occupation. They report 
significant correlation between risk and individual risk attitude: more risk averse 
individuals sort into jobs with less earnings variance. Negative results are reported by 
Kodde (1985), who uses Dutch questionnaire data on individual students’ expectations. 
He finds no clear effects of the gap between an individual’s expected highest and 
expected lowest earnings, after university education, to attend university.  
 
Belzil and Leonardi (2007) measure risk attitudes from answers on the reservation price 
for a hypothetical lottery. Conditional on completing senior high school (in Italy), the 
probability to go on to university appears to be decreasing in risk aversion, with an effect 
as large as that of parental education. However, conditional on junior high school the 
decision to attend senior high school is increasing in risk aversion. That would imply that 
individuals see a university education as risky and senior high school education as an 
insurance. Hartog and Diaz Serrano (2007) find that Spanish high school graduates are 
less inclined to go to university in provinces where the return to university is more risky 
(as measured by residual earnings variance), and that the effect is indeed mitigated by   46
declining risk aversion. Flyer and Rosen (1997) derive that someone who in her lifecycle 
anticipates to devote less time to market activity should behave as if she were more risk 
averse. Indeed they find in CPS two-digit occupation data that the coefficient of variation 
of women’s wages correlates negatively with the percentage of women in the occupation: 
women flock into less risky occupations. 
  
Shaw (1996) argues that on-the-job training is a risky investment and that less risk averse 
individuals will invest more; hence, less risk averse individuals should have higher wage 
growth. She measures risk attitudes from the share of wealth held in risky assets and from direct 
survey questions.  Indeed, less risk averse individuals have higher wage growth. If the share of 
financial wealth invested in risky assets increases from the sample mean of 0.1 to 0.4, the share 
of human capital devoted to investment in creating new human capital would also increase 
fourfold. The 3-year growth rate of the wage would then increase from 6.6% to 7.8 %, i.e. an 
increase by 18%. We can use some of her results to calculate that compensation for earnings risk 
as emphasized in this paper has an elasticity of about 0.5: moving from the class of above-
average risk takers to the class of average risk takers, residual log wage variance falls by 50% 
while the average wage falls by 30%, moving to the class of no-risk takers, residual log wage 
variance falls by 70%, while the average wage falls by 40%. Shaw’s results provide strong 
evidence in favour of our approach. Her results are not based on assumed risk taking behaviour, 
they hold for individuals who differ in stated risk attitudes. Individuals who indicate that they 
take more financial risk in order to obtain larger gains have higher average wage and higher 
residual wage variance. The same relationship holds in growth rates: less risk averse individuals   47
have higher wage growth rate and higher variance of residual wage growth
14.  In a replication 
study for the US, Germany, Spain and Italy (Budria et al, 2009), we confirm that risk attitudes 
are relevant for wages (support for the original Shaw specifications is mixed though, and we find 
that in particular the wage level is sensitive to attitudes towards risk taking, more so than wage 
growth). Brown and Taylor (2005) report support for the Shaw model in British data.   
 
Hartog and Vijverberg (2002) estimate structural parameters in wage compensation 
equations like (26) for US data. The estimated coefficient of relative risk aversion is 0.64 
for men and 0.46 for women, which is in the low end of the interval of estimates from 
various sources, such as consumption–savings models, TV games and direct surveys. The 
coefficient of relative skewness affection is estimated at 1.03 for men and 2.18 for 
women, also well within the interval of results found elsewhere in structural models (e.g. 
using a CRRA utility function and thus directly connecting risk aversion and prudence,  
Hubbard et al, 1994 take relative risk aversion at 3 and relative prudence at 4 as 
representing empirical findings, while Keane and Wolpin, 2001, report values of 1.5 and 
2.5 respectively; generally, the range of values found in the empirical literature is very 
wide). The interesting observation is that the implied preference parameters are very 
much in line with similar values found in quite different applications, and that attitudes 
towards financial risk in the labour market are not fundamentally different from attitudes 
revealed in consumption-saving decisions. Skyt Nielsen and Vissing-Jorgenson (2006) 
estimate a model of educational choice for 50 Danish post-high school educations, 
characterising returns to education from a long panel of individuals, correcting the 
                                                 
14 The effect of the increase in the risky asset share is given in Shaw’s Table 2. Changes in mean wages by 
risk class are given by the regression results at the bottom of page 641. Variances by risk class are given in 
footnote 22.    48
earnings data for selectivity. They find a clear negative effect of earnings risk on 
choosing an education, in particular for the permanent component of the variance. They 
use a utility function with constant relative risk aversion and estimate the coefficient at 5. 
This is much higher than what Vijverberg and Hartog (2002) find, with a more flexible 




8. Alternative  explanations 
 
One might conjecture that the observed relationship reflects something other than risk 
compensation. One argument might be that earnings distributions obey the lognormal 
distribution, in which a relationship between mean and variance is implied. It is well 
known that when a variable W has a lognormal distribution with parameters µ and σ
2, 
there is a linear relationship between the mean and standard deviation of W: 
[ ] ()
2 exp 0.5 EW µ σ =+ and one may write the variance of W as 
() [] () ()
2 2 exp 1 Var W E W σ =− .  Thus mean and variance of W will both increase if the 
log variance increases, and even the relative variance (the coefficient of variation) will 
increase.  Thus, one might argue that we only have reproduced a property of the 
lognormal distribution. There are several arguments to counter this interpretation. First, 
lognormality does not explain anything: even if we were to observe that a variable 
perfectly obeys a lognormal distribution, we still want to know why this is so. Risk 
compensation might be precisely the argument. Second, lognormality is not an iron law   49
and statistical tests often reject it (as we show in Hartog and Vijverberg, 2002 for our 
type of data). Third, in Diaz-Serrano, Hartog and Nielsen (2003) we find risk 
compensation in earnings also if we measure risk as the intertemporal variation in 
earnings from panel data; in this case there is even less reason to believe that we just 
reproduce an iron law of distribution. Fourth, a reasonable model of schooling choices 
and resulting earnings distributions by education does not imply a necessarily positive 
relationship between mean and variance. Suppose, schooling just slices off successive 
segments of an ability distribution and transforms ability monotonically into marketable 
skills. Then, mean income by schooling will increase, but dispersion measures will 
depend on ability dispersion within the segments and the schooling transformation 
function; such a model may easily exhibit earnings variance declining in schooling level. 
Finally, the most compelling counter-argument is that it would require skew also to be 
positively related to the mean, as skew for a lognormal variable equals 
22 (2 exp ) exp 1 σσ +− . However, we consistently find a negative relationship.   
  
Could it be that an underlying skill price effect drives the result?  If earnings emerge as 
the reward for a skill, with the price of the skill determined in the labour market, an 
increase in the market price of the skill, with stable underlying skill distribution, will 
increase both mean and variance of earnings. But if so, the third moment of the earnings 
distribution should also go up.  
 
Tournament theory (Lazear and Rosen, 1981) also implies a relationship between mean 
and variance: if shocks to performance become more important, both mean and variance   50
of wages will be affected. With risk neutral agents, optimal effort is independent of the 
variance of the shocks to output
15; increasing shock variance does not affect output or 
mean wage. The spread between the two wages increases as the shock variance 
increases
16. Hence, as one would expect, if agents are risk neutral, with wage spread 
increasing and mean wage unaffected, there is no compensation for increasing risk.  In 
case of risk averse agents, the relationship between mean and dispersion may be positive 
or negative, depending on parameter values (see Appendix 2).  
 
Job search theory has a systematic explanation for the persistence of wage differences 
among observationally identical individuals, pointing to the cost of mobility and of 
searching for information. A distribution with a large dispersion presents ample 
opportunity to find a high wage, and one might think the theory yields the same 
predictions as the risk compensation model. This is not the case however: in job search 
models a positive association between mean and dispersion of observed wages may arise, 
but a negative relationship is a distinct possibility. In the simplest possible model, 
unemployed workers sample from a wage offer distribution with a reservation wage. As 
Mortensen (1986, p 864) shows, an increase in the dispersion of the wage offer 
distribution increases the reservation wage. If one assumes the wage offer distribution to 
be normal, an increase in the truncation level from a higher reservation wage will 
increase the mean of the observed wage distribution (realised offers) while the effect on 
                                                 
15 Equation (9) in Lazear and Rosen (198l) and page 31 in Lazear (1995). 
16 Equation (10), Lazear and Rosen (1981): increasing shock variance reduces g(0).   51
the variance cannot be unambiguously signed.
17 Thus, this model does not 
unambiguously predict the observed positive relationship between mean and variance of 
observed wages. This basic mechanism remains in more complicated models.
18  In a 
more informal sense one might point to the appreciation that individuals will have for a 
higher dispersion in the job offer distribution, as this will bring them higher expected 
wage. This would have a negative effect on mean wages, as supply increases. If the 
higher wage is to be realised from repeated search, after entering the labour market, and 
if the higher variance in the offer distribution translates into higher variance in the 
observed wage distribution, one may perhaps expect a lower starting wage in high 
variance educations, as individuals appreciate the opportunity to search in a distribution 
with great opportunities, and a higher mean wage after sufficient experience, when search 
has paid off. Thus, while in this case predictions are identical for advanced careers, the 
effect on early careers stages has the power to discriminate. The SEO/Elsevier data 
analysed in Berkhout, Hartog and Webbink (2006) are restricted to starting wages, 1 to 2 
years after graduating from tertiary education. As Table 3 above shows, starting wages 
respond positively to risk (variance), which does not support the merger of risk 
preferences and search theory. The role of skewness in search theory has not been 
investigated. Intuitively, one expects opposing effects: the opportunity to arrive in the 
high end of the distribution, by prolonged search, will push up mean earnings. But as 
individuals like this opportunity, they will accept a lower wage. Again, one might 
differentiate by career stages. At young ages, the effect of increased supply dominates 
                                                 
17 See Maddala (1983), p.365. The conditional mean M of the truncated normal distribution is positive in 
threshold c. The conditional variance V= 1 – M(M-c) cannot be signed as M is positive in c but M-c is 
negative, as the derivative of M to c is smaller than 1.   
18 In Gautier and Moraga Gonzales (2003), wage dispersion is non-monotonic in labour market tightness: it 
first increases and then decreases with increasing tightness.    52
and the wage will be depressed. Later, when individuals have moved up through search, 
the wage should be boosted. But as pointed out above, the estimated effects for starters in 
the labour market have no different signs
19.    
 
 
9.  What have we learned, what remains to be done?     
 
Our empirical results have quite convincingly shown that wages in an 
occupation/education relate positively to the residual variance and negatively to the 
residual skew of wages within that occupation/education. These results are compatible 
with risk averse individuals demanding compensation for risk and willing to pay for 
favourable odds to obtain really high wages. We have given several supporting 
arguments that make this a plausible link.  
 
The magnitudes of the elasticities are not large. Interestingly, including the risk 
compensation terms in the Mincer equation has generally no effect on the estimated rate 
of return to education. This indicates that the estimated return does not suffer from 
omitted variable bias if risk is ignored, counter to the suggestions of Weiss (1972), Olson, 
White and Shefrin (1979) and Low and Ormiston (1991). The outcome is compatible 
with the finding that (residual) earnings dispersion within schooling categories has no 
                                                 
19 One commentator has remarked that workers can continue searching on the job and that there is repeated 
sampling rather than a single draw. This would imply that risk is not properly measured by observed wage 
variance. However, the argument is more complex. Repeated sampling keeps chopping off the lower end of 
the offer distribution, with presently earned wages as threshold. If the variance of the offer distribution 
increases, this will increase the mean of observed wages. But as the effect on observed variance cannot 
even be predicted for a single draw, the effect on observed variance in this case will be even harder to 
predict. Hence, we cannot predict the relationship between mean and variance of observed wages.     53
robust standard pattern in relation to the level of schooling (schooling and risk are 
uncorrelated, as was demonstrated empirically in Raita (2005, Chapter 4)).  
 
Although we believe that risk compensation in wages is genuine, a true test on causality 
would be most welcome. However, so far we have been unable to find a natural 
experiment or a good instrument for risk. A relevant concern is the correlation of risk 
attitude with other variables that may enhance earnings. If high-risk activities attract 
individuals with more ambition, greater drive, lower discount rate, then the reward for 
these traits will show up in higher earnings that give the appearance of compensation for 
risk. Note however that this argument does not seem to hold for ability, to the extent that 
the methods used to control for ability are sufficient (our use of school grades, IQ 
measures used in some regressions, using individual expectations and including 
individual fixed effects as regressor).  
 
More can be done, both in theoretical modeling and empirical testing. For example, it 
might be useful to filter out compensation for choice variables from the wage equation 
and use a standardised wage net of compensation for disamenities. If people prefer 
working for a small firm rather than a big firm then the wage reduction may just equalise 
the utility from working for different sized firms and the associated wage variation 
should not be part of risk. But this assumes that all such variations are fully voluntary and 
individuals can freely choose from their wage frontier, which may not be true. Many such 
variables are not known in advance and can neither be freely adjusted at zero cost. In that 
sense they may well be part of the individual’s uncertainty and be rightly included in the   54
wage dispersion measure. Still, from a theoretical perspective, one might prefer to 
measure potential wages, standardized for such effects to the extent possible.  
 
We also think that there are strong arguments to accept the observed residual wage 
distribution as the agents’ source of information on risk, and that there is no reason to 
apply a correction for unobserved heterogeneity. Indeed, in those cases where (some) 
unobserved heterogeneity was accounted for (controlling for ability, using individuals’ 
predicted wages rather than market wages), the basic conclusions were upheld. But this is 
a very controversial issue. At the same time it points to a most interesting direction for 
further research:  uncovering of information that potential students use when they decide 
on their schooling. Heckman has set a challenging standard by claiming that at least half 
of the ex post variance in earnings is foreseen by individuals ex ante. Direct survey 
information from students suggests much more ignorance. Investigating students’ 
information sets is not only relevant for the issue tackled in this paper, but has far wider 





   
                                                 
20 Nicholson and Souleles (2001) report that individually expected income is a better predictor of specialty 
chosen by medical students than actual income, whether contemporaneous or realized. Predicting specialty 
choice with actual contemporaneous average income by specialty, uncorrected for selection bias, is correct 
in 57.3% of the cases. Using, instead, individually expected incomes with selectivity correction for actually 
chosen specialty yields correct predictions in 85.6%. Using realised average incomes as predictors of future 
incomes yields 50.6% correct predictions, whereas using expectations on the same subsample gives 72.8 
correct predictions. These differences are also affected by the difference between using individual 
expectations and group averages, with much less variation. 
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Appendix 1. Risk compensation in Levhari and Weiss (1974) 
 
 

























































Kodde (1985, Chapter 7) shows, using a second-order Taylor expansion around  ( ) E µ  
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2 σ is the variance of µ . Assuming  0 fλµµ= , as Levhari and Weiss (1974) 






























where  ρ  is relative risk aversion evaluated at expected values. Thus, with risk aversion 
positive, and fλµ  positive as assumed by Levhari and Weiss, under uncertainty the   62
expected return on human capital surpasses the Mincer rate by a term that is proportional 
to risk aversion and relative variance.   63
Appendix 2. Mean and dispersion in the tournament model (Lazear and Rosen, 1981) 
 













 with   " 0 as C =Π >  
 
















This holds because C’ > 0 and C” > 0 by assumption. One might also write the 
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i.e. if the elasticity of effort is between zero and the inverse of what might be called 
relative effort aversion. The elasticity is endogenous, characterizing the dislocation of 
equilibrium effort. If we substitute from equation (1) above, we can derive   64
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This is ambiguous in sign, depending on exogenous parameter values. 
 